Posted on July 17, 2026
Congratulations to Fiddler Nation for making it to the semifinals of the World Cup! All four teams that made it this far are equally matched in that they each possess the same total amount of “energy.” In advance of each semifinal game, teams must independently decide how much of their energy to allocate to the match; all remaining energy goes toward the finals. The team that spends more energy in any given game will win. The semifinals and finals occur so close in time that teams can’t recuperate any of their energy in between.
You’ve heard that the managers for the other three teams are abysmal and have no idea how to allocate their teams’ energy. Each of the other managers will independently pick a random percentage between 0 and 100 and allocate that portion of their team’s energy to the semifinal game; the rest of that team’s energy will go toward the final.
Since you’re the cleverest manager of the bunch, you can choose an optimal strategy that will maximize Fiddler Nation’s probability of winning the World Cup. What is this optimal probability?
Let Fiddler Nation allocate a fraction \(x\) of its energy to the semifinal and \(1-x\) to the final. To win the World Cup, we must win both the semifinal and the final.
In the semifinal, our opponent is an "abysmal" manager who picks a random fraction \(X \sim U(0, 1)\). We win the semifinal if \(x > X\), which happens with probability \(x\).
If we win, we face the winner of the other semifinal in the final. Both teams in the other semifinal were abysmal, picking \(Y_1, Y_2 \sim U(0, 1)\) respectively. The winner of that match used an amount of energy \(W = \max(Y_1, Y_2)\) and thus has \(1-W\) energy remaining for the final. The CDF of \(W\) is \(P(W \le w) = w^2\), so the CDF of the remaining energy \(R = 1-W\) is:
\[ F_R(r) = P(1-W \le r) = P(W \ge 1-r) = 1 - (1-r)^2 = 2r - r^2. \]
We win the final if our remaining energy \(1-x\) is greater than the opponent's remaining energy \(R\). Since the other semifinal is independent of ours, the total probability of winning is:
\[ P(x) = P(X < x) \cdot P(R < 1-x) = x \cdot (2(1-x) - (1-x)^2) = x(1-x^2) = x - x^3. \]
To maximize this, we take the derivative and set it to zero: \(1 - 3x^2 = 0\), which gives \(x = 1/\sqrt{3}\). The optimal probability is:
\[ P = \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}} \left(1 - \frac{1}{3}\right) = \frac{2}{3\sqrt{3}} \approx 0.3849. \]
Answer: \(\displaystyle\boxed{\frac{2}{3\sqrt{3}}}\), approximately \(0.3849\).
Fiddler Nation is in the quarterfinals. Eight teams total. Each abysmal manager picks a random percentage of their remaining energy for each match. FN must draw up its strategy \((x, y, z)\) in advance, where \(x+y+z=1\).
For Fiddler Nation to win, it must win three consecutive matches. Let our allocations be \(x, y, z\).
The total winning probability is \(P = x \cdot (y^2 - 2y \ln y) \cdot F_Z(z)\). Numerically optimizing this yields:
\[ x \approx 0.5197, \quad y \approx 0.2296, \quad z \approx 0.2507. \]
Extra credit answer: approximately \(\boxed{0.2816}\).
Adjust your energy allocation to see your probability of winning. Note: the sliders for the Extra Credit will automatically balance so that \(x+y+z=100\%\).
Final allocation: 42.3%
Win Probability: 38.49%
Final allocation (\(z\)): 25.0%
Win Probability: 28.16%
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